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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

*********************
TOM N. SOTER and
HELEN P. SOTER,
his wife,
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
-vs-

Case No. 11119

PAUL C. BOYCE and
HAZEL BOYCE, his
wife,
Defendants
and
Respondents.

*********************
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

*********************
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action by appellants,
(hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs)
against Wasatch Development Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Wasatch)
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for specific performance or damages for
breach of contract, against Paul C.
Boyce and Hazel Boyce (hereinafter ref erred to as defendants) for interference with contract, and for a court
order declaring the delivery of a quit
claim deed by plaintiffs' attorney null
and void.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
Upon motion of appellees and after
making findings of fact the Trial Court
concluded that plaintiffs' complaint as
to defendants should be dismissed with
prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek a reversal of
the judgment below and then for remand
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of the case to the Trial Court for
further proceedings and for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs on September 2, 1963
purchased from Convest Corporation the
Castel Apartments under a uniform real
estate contract and Convest Corporation
subsequently conveyed its interest in
said property to defendants.
Plaintiffs became delinquent on the
payments due under the terms of the contract and on September 17, 1965, entered
into a written agreement with defendants
(R. 67} wherein plaintiffs were given
six months to bring the payments current,
sell or refinance the apartment house;
and if plaintiffs failed so to do, a
quit claim deed to the subject property
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was to be delivered to defendants by
plaintiffs' attorney (R. 18 at paragraph
8).

Pursuant to this agreement plain-

tiffs found a buyer and on February 8,
1966, an earnest money agreement (R. 62)
was executed by plaintiffs as sellers
and Wasatch as buyer, and plaintiffs
thereafter gave a quit claim deed to
Wasatch.
After February 8, 1966, defendants
met with representatives of Wasatch and
induced them to breach its contract with
plaintiffs (R. 62) , to not deal further
with plaintiffs but to deal with defendants (R. 41); and as a result thereof,
Wasatch did not perform its agreement
with plaintiffs to pay plaintiffs consideration valued at $32,000.00 for their
interest in the Castel Apartments and
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piaintif f s were unable to remedy their
default under the uniform real estate
contract.
As provided in the agreement between
plaintiffs and defendants (R. 67) , plaintiffs had executed a quit claim deed (R.
84) and delivered the same to their
attorney, Richard L. Bird, Jr.

When plain-

tiffs became aware that defendants had
interfered with the contract between plaintiffs and Wasatch and that defendants had
prevented performance by Wasatch resulting
in plaintiffs not being able to remedy
the default above mentioned, plaintiffs
contacted their attorney and instructed
him not to deliver the deed (R. 84) to
defendants.

Plaintiffs' attorney, however,

disregarded the instruction and delivered
said deed to defendants.

6
PLAINTIFFS' POSITION
The Trial Court's decision should
be reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings and for trial on the
following grounds:
1.

Plaintiffs pleaded a sound

claim against defendants in interference with contract and plaintiffs are entitled to present their
evidence in support thereof to the
trier of fact.
2.

Plaintiffs pleaded a valid

claim to show that the delivery by
Richard L. Bird, Jr. of the quit
claim deed to the subject property
was invalid and are entitled to
present their evidence in support
thereof to the trier of fact.
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ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS PLEADED A SOUND CLAIM

AGAINST DEFENDANTS BASED ON THE TORT OF
INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT.
A party to a contract has a cause of
action against a person who has procured
a breach of that contract by the other
party thereto, and the theory of this
doctrine is that the right to performance
of a contract is a property right which

is entitled to protection.

KIANG v.

STRYCULA, 231 Cal. App. 2d 809, 42 Cal, R.

338 (1965); GRAFF

~WHITEHOUSE,

71 Ill.

App. 2 412, 219 N.E.2d 128 (1966).
This doctrine had its beginning when
LUMLEY v. GYE, 2 Ell. & B. 216, 118 Eng.
Reprint, 749 (1853), was decided.

In that

case it was found that a singer was under
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contract to sing at the plaintiff's
theatre and was induced by the defendant,
who operated a rival theatre, to break
her contract with the plaintiff and the
Court decided that such interference was
tortious and actionable at law.

The

cases and texts that follow set forth the
following as prima facia elements of the
tort of interference with contract:
1.

Existence of a contract,

2.

Knowledge by defendant of the
existence of the contract,

3.

Intentional interference by
defendant,

4.

Causal relationship between
the contract breach and the
interference by defendant,

5.

Damages suffered by plaintiffs.

GAMMON v. FEDERATED MILK PRODUCERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., 11 Utah 2d 421, 360 P2d
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1018 (1961); BUNNELL ::'.:...:..BILLS, 13 Utah
2d 83, 368 P2d 597

(1962); 84 A.L.R. 43;

26 A.L.R.2d 1247; Restatement, Torts §766

(1939).
In their complaint at paragraph 17,
(R. 57) plaintiffs have alleged that a
contract was entered into between plaintiffs and Wasatch; in paragraph 18 (R.
58)

they have alleged that appellees in-

tentionally and willfully interferred with
said contract causing Wasatch to breach
the same; in paragraph 19 (R. 58) they
alleged that as a result of said interference by defendants, Wasatch failed to
perform its contract and plaintiffs were
damaged thereby.
In view of the history and the cases
developing the subject tort, plaintiffs
submit that each element of the tort has
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been pleaded and, therefore, that a claim
for relief has been stated.

Responsive

to the complaint, appellees did not admit
nor deny the allegations thereof but filed
a motion (R. 73) asking that the complaint
be dismissed and in support of their motion,
filed an affidavit (R. 75).
The Trial Court viewed defendants'
motion as one made pursuant to Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) and treated it
as one for summary judgment.

The record

at that point contained plaintiffs' complaint (R. 55) which set forth a claim
against appellees for interference with
contract and appellants answers to interrogatorie~

(R. 41) which stated in detail

the acts of appellees which appellants
rely upon as evidence of interference.
record contains nothing to challenge the

The
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allegations of the complaint nor the
answers to interrogatories.
Defendants' affidavit (R. 75) in no
way contradicts, denies or challenges
plaintiffs' claim; the most that it and
the attached exhibits do is set forth the
steps followed to divest plaintiffs of
their interest in the subject property.
The fact that plaintiffs have conveyed
their interest to Wasatch is in no way
fatal to plaintiffs' claim against defendants because plaintiffs' claim is not
based upon having an interest in the
subject property but upon their right to
have Wasatch perform its contract which
right was interferred with by defendants.
II.

WASATCH BREACHED ITS AGREEMENT

WITH PLAINTIFFS.
The Trial Court entered its order
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and with it findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 99) but therein did not
specify the reason or reasons for the dismissal and plaintiffs can, therefore, only
speculate as to the reasons for the Court's
ruling and then attempt to rebut those
reasons.
Having been aware of the facts that
plaintiffs had conveyed their interest in
the subject property to Wasatch (R. 74),
the Trial Court may have considered the
transaction between plaintiffs and Wasatch
completed and, therefore, may have decided
that if the contract was performed plaintiffs had no claim against defendants for
induced breach of contract.

If the Court

reached its decision based upon this reasoning, the same is erroneous because even
though plaintiffs executed a quit claim
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deed, Wasatch did not and has not tendered
to plaintiffs the agreed consideration;
therefore, a breach occurred.

These facts

have been pleaded by plaintiffs (R. 58)
and nothing in the record contradicts
them.

The complaint (R. 55) has not been

answered by Wasatch, and defendants' affidavit (R. 75) does not address itself to
this issue.

For purposes of this appeal,

therefore, the allegations stating a breach
by Wasatch must be viewed as being true
and, therefore, this essential element of
the tort of induced breach of contract is
not lacking.
III.

THE DELIVERY OF THE QUIT CLAIM

DEED BY PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY TO DEFENDANTS
WAS INEFFECTIVE.
Another possible basis for dismissing plaintiffs' complaint may have been
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the fact that a

qui~

claim deed to the

subject property (R. 84) was delivered
to defendants by Richard L. Bird, Jr.,
plaintiffs' former attorney.
The basic reason why this fact could
not support a summary dismissal is because,
as above mentioned, plaintiffs have a claim
against defendants, not because they have
an interest in the Castel Apartments, but
because they have a property right in the
performance of a contract by Wasatch, which
right was interferred with by defendants.
Further reason why this fact is not
detrimental to plaintiffs' claim is because the said plaintiffs' attorney delivered the quit claim deed (R. 84) to defendants even though defendants had violated
the terms of the modification agreement
(R. 67) •

It is conceded by plaintiffs
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that they were not able to comply with
the terms of the modification

agree~ent

but they have alleged (R. 58 at paragraph
23) that their failure to comply was
caused by defendants' interference with
plaintiffs' contract with Wasatch, which
allegation has not been denied by defendants.

By so interferring, defendants

breached paragraph 4 of said agreement
(R. 68) and, therefore, the delivery of
the quit claim deed (R. 84) by Richard L.
Bird, Jr. was ineffective and no title
passed to defendants.

Based upon the foregoing arguments,
plaintiffs ask that this Court decide
that a claim upon which relief can be
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granted has been pleaded by plaintiffs
and that tnis matter should be remanded
for further proceedings at the Trial
Court level.
Respectfully submitted,
Carvel R. Shaff er
Thomas R. Blonquist
of and for
BURTON, 3LONQUIST,
CAHOON, MATHESON &
SHAFFER
Suite 640 Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.

